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This paper examines whether investors recognize the implications of
changes in order backlog, a non-GAAP leading indicator, for future
performance. A hedge portfolio strategy taking a long position in the
highest decile of order backlog change and a short position in the lowest
decile of order backlog change earns 13.7 percent in the year after the
hedge portfolio is formed. Moreover, analysts’ forecast errors are large
and negative (overoptimistic) for firms experiencing declines in order
backlog. Overall, our evidence indicates that analysts underreact to the
information in changes in order backlog. In addition, the market does
not appear to see through the relation between changes in order backlog
and future performance and underweights the implications of order
backlog, which contrasts with the findings of Rajgopal, Shevlin, and
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INTRODUCTION
This paper examines whether stock prices reflect information
regarding changes in order backlog. Order backlog is the
aggregate of the sales price of orders received from customers
less the revenue recognized. It represents the unfulfilled portion
of contractual orders and is an important leading indicator of
future sales and earnings. 
Although information about order backlog is not included in
financial statements, it has been considered useful for the task
of equity valuation. Ample anecdotes suggest that investors use
order backlog as a meaningful indicator of future business
prospects.1) Also, prior studies indicate that changes in order
backlog are most closely watched in software, semiconductors,
steel, and aircraft manufacturers (Lev and Thiagarajan 1993;
Chandra Procassini, and Waymire 1999). For example, Lev and
Thiagarajan (1993) find that the percentage change in sales less
the percentage change in order backlog, an earnings
management proxy, is associated with abnormal returns.
Penman (2007) also stresses that a decline in order backlog is
one of the red flag indicators for valuation analysis in his
financial statement textbook, suggesting that order backlog is an
important value driver.
Recently, Rajogpal, Shevlin, and Venkatachalam (2003),
hereafter RSV (2003), examine whether market participants fully
incorporate the implications of the level of order backlog relative
to the level of operations (average total assets) for future earnings
during the sample period of 1981-1999. They provide evidence
suggesting that the stock market overweights the contribution of
order backlog in predicting future earnings. They find that firms
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1) Several analysts sell investment advice using this information. For example,
such recommendations are included in “Companies and Finance the
Americas” (Financial Times, 7/18/2002), “Meet ITT, the Defense Play”
(Business Week, 11/7/2001), “Barron’s Mutual Fund Forum” (Barron’s,
6/2/1997), “Corporate Performance 1997 Review: 2nd Quarter” (Wall Street
Journal, 8/4/1997), and “Swelling Backlog Sets for a Surge in Earnings”
(Barron’s, 8/19/1991).
with higher order backlog earn lower future returns, which is
inconsistent with Lev and Thiagarajan (1993)’s conjecture that
higher order backlog is a good signal for future sales and
earnings. 
The level of order backlog is associated with product cycles.
Firms with long product cycles tend to have higher order
backlogs, while those firms with short product cycles are likely to
have lower order backlogs. Consequently, the levels of order
backlog may not be comparable across industries. For example,
the level of order backlog for Boeing in the fiscal year of 1998 is
more than 300 percent of its average total assets. The level of
order backlog to the operation level is relatively high because of
its long product cycle. By contrast, the level of order backlog for
Nike in the same year is 79 percent of its average total assets.
This difference does not necessarily indicate that Boeing will
have a more favorable future performance than Nike. Indeed,
Nike shows a marginal increase in order backlog, while Boeing
suffers a 70 percent decrease in order backlog relative to that of
the previous year. Thus, we believe that the results by RSV
(2003) are confounded by the use of the level variable without
considering the level of order backlog being a function of product
cycles. 
In this study, we reexamine the relation between order backlog
and future returns using a change variable. More specifically, we
investigate whether stock prices fully recognize the implications
of changes in order backlog for future performance. Changes in
order backlog represent an indicator for future performance free
of measurement errors (associated with product cycles). Also,
there are a substantial number of anecdotes suggesting that this
measure is often used for equity valuation. 
Using a sample of 32,738 firm-years for the sample period of
1971-1999, we find that stock prices act as if investors
underreact to the implications of changes in order backlog. In
other words, firms with steep increases in order backlog
experience positive future, abnormal returns, while firms with
steep declines in order backlog suffer negative future abnormal
returns. A hedge portfolio strategy taking a long position in the
stocks of firms in the highest decile of order backlog change and
a short position in the stocks of firms in the lowest decile of
order backlog change generates a 13.7 percent return in the
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following 12 months, on average, during the sample period of
1971-1999. We find evidence regarding the stability of the
abnormal returns to the trading strategy. The hedge portfolio
return is positive in 26 of the 29 years examined. Furthermore,
we find that analysts’ forecast errors contribute to the mispricing
of order backlog changes. The forecast errors for firms with high
declines in order backlog are larger (more optimistic) than the
forecast errors for firms with high increases in order backlog.
This evidence is consistent with the notion that analysts do not
fully incorporate the implications of changes in order backlog
into their forecasts, and investors overprice those stocks with
high declines in order backlog. This finding also suggests that
analysts play an important role in the market’s underreaction to
order backlog. 
Our paper is different from RSV (2003) in that we provide
compelling evidence of the market’s underreaction to information
on order backlog, inconsistent with RSV’s overreaction
explanation. We also provide corroborate evidence that the
market’s underreaction is in part attributable to analysts’ bias in
forecasts. We add more evidence to a growing body of literature
on market inefficiency. This also enables us to better understand
how the market perceives the order backlog-related signals. In
addition, our paper contributes to the literature on the
disclosure of non-GAAP leading indicators (Lev and Thiagarajan,
1993; Chandra, Procassini and Waymire, 1999) by providing
evidence that order backlog is value-relevant and useful to
investors.
Our findings have several disclosure implications for regulators
and auditors with respect to order backlog, more broadly, non-
GAAP leading indicators. Despite its recognized importance as a
nonfinancial measure in valuation, the current GAAP does not
require firms to disclose information on order backlog in their
financial statements. This lack of information on non-GAAP
leading indicators in turn deters investors from making informed
decisions. Put differently, the information outside financial
statements, such as changes in order backlog, are hidden from
investors who would might wish to interpret their implications
for valuation. Our findings highlight the importance of fully
disclosing fundamental value drivers, in particular, non-GAAP
leading indicators. 
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We note some caveats in this paper. Caution should be used
when interpreting the results in this study. Order backlog must
be disclosed in the Management Discussion and Analysis (MD &
A) only if it is material. Our analyses are conditional on the
existence of backlog data on COMPUSTAT.2) Thus, our results
may not be generalized to all COMPUSTAT firms. In addition, it is
possible that unobservable firm characteristics related to
changes in order backlog could cause the findings in this study.
We will leave this issue for future research. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
reviews prior literature on non-GAAP leading indicators. Section
3 describes our empirical procedures, including the sample
selection and variable definitions. In section 4 we present the
empirical results. The final section concludes the study.
LITERATUER REVIEW
There is a voluminous literature on non-GAAP leading
indicators. Recent studies include customer satisfaction
measures (Ittner and Larcker 1998), patent data (Deng, Lev, and
Narin 1999), market penetration (Amir and Lev 1996), and
eyeball measures in the internet industry (Trueman, Wong, and
Zhang 2000). Ittner and Larcker (1998) examine the value
relevance of customer satisfaction measures using customer,
business-unit, and firm-level data and find that the relations
between customer satisfaction measures and future accounting
performance are positive and statistically significant. Deng, Lev,
and Narin (1999) relate patent citation data to book-to-market
ratios and firms’ stock prices. Deng, Lev, and Narin (1999) find
that patent citation data are positively related to investor growth
expectations, but they find a somewhat weaker relation between
patent citation data and stock prices. Amir and Lev (1996)
examine the value-relevance in the wireless communication
industry. They find that earnings, book values, and cash flows
are generally irrelevant while nonfinancial measures such as
POPs (growth potential) and market penetration determine
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2) In our unreported results, we find that the mean market capitalization for
firms with order backlog is smaller that that for the overall COMPUSTAT
sample.
cellular values. Trueman, Wong, and Zhang (2000) find that
while bottom-line net income is not significantly associated with
stock prices, unique visitors and page views provide incremental
explanatory power for stock prices, consistent with those who
claim that financial information is of limited use in the valuation
of internet stocks. These studies suggest that nonfinancial
measures can be leading indicators of financial performance. 
Even though order backlog is frequently used for valuation
purposes in practice and is economically significant, the
literature on order backlog is limited. Lev and Thiagarajan (1993)
examine the value-relevance of various fundamental signals for
future performance identified in Value Line analyst reports, such
as receivables growth, inventory growth, capital expenditures,
gross margin, etc. They consider the difference between sales
changes and order backlog changes as one of 13 fundamental
signals. They view an excess percentage change in order backlog
over percentage change in sales as a bad signal and interpret
this to result from poor management or opportunistic earnings
management (which is prevalent in high-tech industries). They
find that order backlog is value-relevant and has a positive
association with future earnings. Also, this earnings
management measure is associated with future returns.3)
Relatedly, Liu, Livnat, and Ryan (1996) provide evidence that
backlog disclosure is useful in predicting future sales. 
Chandra, Procassini, and Waymire (1999) report significant
stock price movements on the release dates of aggregate industry
data for new orders and shipments (the industry book-to-bill
ratio) by the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) each
month. The industry information released is positively correlated
with earnings changes in the subsequent, quarterly earnings
announcements of firms within the industry. This study provides
evidence that order backlog is a value-relevant indicator.
A recent study by RSV (2003) investigates whether the market
incorporates the implications of order backlog, using the level of
order backlog during the sample period of 1981-1999. They find
that the level of order backlog is negatively related to future
returns. In addition, they show that analysts efficiently process
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3) Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) find that excess inventory growth is a bad signal
and that order backlog is incremental to inventory changes to capture future
performance.
this information, using the Mishkin test. However, they find
evidence suggesting that the market places excessive emphasis
on the order backlog signal because the extent to which order
backlog predicts a firm’s future earnings is not clear. Their
results suggest that investors do not use value-relevant
information provided by analysts. 
Although RSV (2003) show the economic significance of order
backlog, the level of order backlog could be a noisy predictor of
future performance. The level of order backlog is associated with
product cycles such that firms with long product cycles tend to
have high order backlogs. By comparison, changes in order
backlog filter this noise and provide a cross-sectionally
comparable measure. This measure is also different than an
earnings management proxy, sales changes less order backlog
changes, suggested by Lev and Thiagarajan (1993), which
captures the amount of unrealized sales recorded in the current
year. Thus, an empirical examination of whether investors
understand the implications of backlog using changes in order
backlog is warranted. 
SAMPLE SELECTION
Our initial sample of 41, 325 firm-years includes all firms with
a non-zero order backlog from the year 2000 COMPUSTAT for
the period of 1971-1999. We then delete 8,587 firm-year
observations for which return data are not available from CRSP.
This results in a final sample of 32,738 firm-year observations
and 3,812 firms. To conduct an analysis that requires analysts’
forecasts in IBES datasets, we match our sample with the IBES
datasets. Our sample size reduces to 13,223 observations for the
analysis of analyst forecast errors because of data availability.
Our study uses annual, one-year-ahead earnings forecasts (FY1)
from the I/B/E/S summary file.
Order backlog represents the dollar value of orders that are
unfulfilled and are scheduled to be delivered in the future. The
variable of interest in this study is order backlog change. We
define order backlog change as follows:
DBKLGt = Backlog (data98) of year t deflated by average total
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assets in year t – Backlog (data98) of year t -1 deflated by average
total assets in year t -1.
We define two measures of analyst forecast errors as follows:
FERR1it = (Ait - Fit)/|Ait|(FERR1)
FERR2it = (Ait - Fit)/PRICEit(FERR2)
where Ait = Actual EPS for firm i in year t, 
Fit = median analyst forecast for firm i in year t,
PRICEit = stock price for firm i when the consensus is
issued. 
To eliminate outlier effects, we delete the forecast errors at the
top 1 percent and the bottom 1 percent.4) Table 1 provides
statistics on changes in order backlog, returns, and forecast
errors in the sample. Descriptive statistics related to changes in
order backlog are reported in Panel A of table 1. The mean
(median) value of order backlog changes is -0.014 (-0.007) for the
whole sample. This indicates that order backlog change is on
average -1.4% of average total assets. The breakdown of the
sample into the three time periods is also provided. Although the
COMPUSTAT coverage increases in recent years, the number of
the order backlog observations remains stable across years. The
standard deviation of order backlog change is 1.12, suggesting
that the variable varies substantially during the sample period. 
Panel B of table 1 reports the industry composition of the
sample. Consistent with RSV (2003), the manufacturing industry
(whose SIC codes range from 2000 to 3900) accounts for a large
number of observations, about 78 percent of the sample. The
service industry comprises another 8 percent of the sample. 
Panel C of table 1 presents the descriptives of returns and
forecast errors. The average of raw returns (size-adjusted
returns) is 18.2% (16.6%). FERR1 (FERR2) for the average firm is
-0.312 (-0.016), suggesting that analysts are on average
optimistic. 
In our untabulated results, we find that the level of order
backlog (in the sample) varies substantially across industries.
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4) FERR1 is likely to be exaggerated if the denominator is close to zero. We also
eliminate firm-years where the absolute value of actual eps is less than 5
cents. The results are qualitatively similar. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Distribution of Order Backlog Changes
N Mean Std Median Quartile 1 Quartile 3
All 32,738 -0.0143 1.1185 -0.0065 -0.0090 0.0063
1971-1980 9,707 0.0100 0.4507 0.0029 -0.0860 0.0952
1981-1990 11,732 -0.0279 0.3923 -0.0141 -0.1044 0.0531
1991-1999 11,299 -0.0210 1.8139 -0.0077 -0.0813 0.0501
Panel B: Industry Composition
N Mean Std Median Quartile 1 Quartile 3
Mineral 306 0.0065 0.7125 -0.0090 -0.1033 0.0591
Construction 1,044 -0.0236 0.7248 -0.0094 -0.2080 0.1277
Manufacturing 25,640 -0.0182 1.1187 -0.0059 -0.0860 0.0624
Transport., Comm., 454 -0.0594 0.6578 -0.0087 -0.1174 0.0692
Utilities
Wholesale Trade 1,071 0.0507 1.9038 -0.0071 -0.0743 0.0495
Retail Trade 230 -0.0152 0.1801 -0.0086 -0.0506 0.0156
Finance, Insurance, 855 -0.0439 0.7205 -0.0084 -0.0672 0.0245
Real Estate
Service 2,824 0.0147 1.1311 -0.0077 -0.1352 0.1001
Other 314 -0.0236 0.2664 -0.0121 -0.1062 0.0510
Panel C: Distribution of Returns and Forecast Errors
N Mean Std Median Quartile 1 Quartile 3
Raw Returns 32,738 0.182 0.743 0.055 -0.217 0.403
Size Adjusted 32,738 0.166 0.249 0.143 -0.006 0.307
Returns
FERR1 11,292 -0.312 1.284 -0.005 -0.162 0.035
FERR2 12,658 -0.016 0.066 -0.0002 -0.009 0.002
The size-adjusted returns are computed by subtracting the raw return
on a size-matched portfolio formed from size-decile groupings provided
by CRSP. 
FERR1 is the forecast error defined as actual earnings less the median
forecast (at the fiscal period end of year t + 1) divided by the absolute
value of actual eps.
FERR2 is the forecast error defined as actual earnings less the median
forecast (at the fiscal period end of year t + 1) divided by price. 
For example, the means of the level of order backlog for the
construction industry and service industry are 141 percent and
108 percent of average total assets, respectively. The means for
manufacturing and finance are 52 percent and 33 percent,
respectively, relative to average total assets. Transportation
(which includes aircraft and ship building) maintains a mean of
115 percent of average total assets. These results support the
view that the level of order backlog depends on the typical
industry product cycle. This also suggests that RSV employ a
noisy measure for the tests of market efficiency. 
To test market efficiency, portfolio returns are constructed by
compounding monthly returns on CRSP. To ensure that all the
necessary accounting variables are known to the market, we
match the accounting variables for all fiscal years ending in
calendar year t and form decile portfolios 4 months after the
fiscal year end where order backlog changes are reported. Then,
we examine the subsequent performance of our portfolios for one
year using returns data from CRSP. Stock returns are measured
as compounded buy-hold returns, inclusive of dividends and
other distributions. Following conventional practice, we replace
firm returns with the corresponding size decile returns if the firm
is delisted during the portfolio-holding period. But if a firm is
established in the middle of the accumulation period, we start to
accumulate returns from the first month it appears. Within each
portfolio, we equally weight all the stocks and compute returns
using the annual buy-and-hold strategy. Size-adjusted returns
are the firm’s raw returns less the returns of the corresponding
size decile, where size is measured using market capitalization at
the fiscal year end. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Do Stock Prices Fully Incorporate the Information in Order Backlog
Changes?
As noted above, we investigate whether the stock market acts
as if it appreciates the implication of changes in order backlog.5)
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5) In an untabulated analysis, we also confirm that the change of order backlog
is positively related with future earnings.
To address this issue, we form portfolios in the sample period
with respect to changes in order backlog and examine whether
these portfolios generate differential returns. For each year from
1971 to 1999, firms are sorted on the magnitude of order backlog
changes and put in decile portfolios based on changes in order
backlog. The returns are accumulated beginning 4 months after
the fiscal year end. 
In untabulated analysis, we replicate RSV (2003) and find a
significant negative relation between the level of order backlog
and size-adjusted returns (p = 0.04), consistent with RSV (2003).
Table 2 reports raw returns and size-adjusted returns to the
investment position based on changes in order backlog over the
29 years. The results show that both raw returns and size-
adjusted returns are generally monotonically increasing with
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Low 3,262 0.0960 -0.0650 -0.0278 -0.1611
2 3,273 0.1600 -0.0032 0.0168 -0.1096
3 3,280 0.1484 -0.0199 0.0429 -0.0916
4 3,276 0.1948 0.0263 0.0611 -0.0637
5 3,271 0.1714 0.0052 0.0693 -0.0679
6 3,281 0.1986 0.0320 0.0793 -0.0449
7 3,278 0.1986 0.0332 0.0795 -0.0526
8 3,278 0.2041 0.0372 0.0794 -0.0512
9 3,275 0.2187 0.0487 0.0625 -0.0745
High 3,264 0.2361 0.0722 0.0705 -0.0528
High-Low 0.1401** 0.1372** 0.0983†† 0.1083††
** denotes significance at the 0.01 level using a two-tailed t-test.
†† denotes significance at the 0.01 level using a two-tailed wilcoxon
ranksum test.
The size-adjusted returns are computed by subtracting the raw return
on a size-matched portfolio formed from size-decile groupings provided
by CRSP. 
The high-low return is the return from investing long in the highest
order backlog change portfolio and investing short in the lowest order
backlog change portfolio for zero net investment.
changes in order backlog. Portfolio returns range from 10% 
(p < 0.01) for the lowest order backlog change portfolio to 24% 
(p < 0.01) for the highest order backlog change portfolio. The
mean (median) raw return difference between the highest and
lowest decile portfolios is 14.0% (9.8%). On a size-adjusted basis,
the mean (median) difference is 13.7% (10.8%). The mean return
to a hedge portfolio taking a long position in the highest portfolio
(biggest increases in order backlog) and a short position in the
lowest portfolio is 14.0% on a raw return basis and 13.7% on a
size-adjusted basis. The difference is statistically significant 
(p-value < 0.01). In an unreported analysis, there is evidence of
the predicted, positive relation for the second year following
portfolio formation. The remaining two columns in table 2
provide median portfolio returns. The results are generally
consistent with those obtained in the means. 
Furthermore, we examine whether this hedge portfolio strategy
generates positive, abnormal returns across years. Figure 1
demonstrates the annual hedge portfolio return for each of the
29 years in the sample. The returns used to generate the plot are
size-adjusted returns. The average of the 29 years is the mean
size-adjusted return of 13.7% in table 2. Figure 1 illustrates that
the hedge portfolio earns a positive return in 26 years out of the
29 years, suggesting that the relation between changes in order
backlog and abnormal returns is not time-specific. The years
producing a negative return are 1971, when the return was -
0.09%; 1977, when the return was -0.05%; and 1999, when the
return was -8.2%.6)
However, changes in order backlog might also reflect risk
factors for individual stocks. Hence, the results in this section
might not show the pure effect from changes in order backlog on
stock returns. To check this possibility, we examine whether
changes in order backlog are forecast in excess of those predicted
by commonly used proxies for risk. To examine empirically the
incremental effect of backlog changes on the predictability of
abnormal returns, we run the following Fama and MacBeth-type
cross-sectional regressions (Fama and French 1992) to control
for risk factors.
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6) Although not reported in Table 2, a hedge portfolio in fiscal 2000 produced
0.88% when the available return data were used. 
RETit+1 = β0 + β1DBKLGit + β2LSIZEit + β3BETAit + β4BPit +
β5LEVit + β6EPit
where RETit+1 is one-year, buy-and-hold raw returns; DBKLGit is
change in order backlog; LSIZEit is the log of size; BETAit is CAPM
beta, measured by estimating the market model on the prior 60
monthly stock returns; BPit is the book-to-market ratio; LEVit is
leverage, defined as the ratio of total assets to the book value of
equity; and EPit is the earnings-to-price ratio.
Table 3 provides additional evidence on the robustness of the
association between changes in order backlog and returns. This
table displays the mean coefficients from estimating the
coefficients of the 29 regressions during the sample period from
1971 to 1999. For each year, we run a regression of returns on
changes in order backlog and other risk factors. The means of
the estimated coefficients are presented with t-statistics. T-
statistics are computed using the ratio of the mean coefficient to
the standard deviation of the annual coefficients. Table 3 reports
the results from the regressions of returns on change in order
backlog and a variety of other variables that have been shown to
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Figure 1. Returns by Calendar Year to a Hedge Portfolio
This figure presents mean returns to a hedge portfolio taking a long
position in the stock of firms in the highest decile of order backlog
change and a short position in the stock of firms in the lowest decile of
order backlog change. Order backlog change is the difference in order
backlogs (relative to average total assets) between year t and year t - 1.0.





















































predict returns (i.e., size, beta, book-to-market, leverage, and
earnings-to-price). As expected, the mean coefficient on changes
in order backlog is positive and statistically significant (the t-
statistics range from 5.03 to 5.71 and the p-values are less than
0.01). The coefficients on the variables are interpreted as
abnormal returns after controlling for other factors. We also
repeat the analysis using size-adjusted returns (untabulated),
and the results are quite similar. Thus, the predictability of
future returns using changes in order backlog is incremental to
the returns expected from risk factors. Our evidence indicates
that the market places less weight on changes in order backlog
for future performance. In other words, the market underreacts
to the news embedded in changes in order backlog in predicting
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Table 3. Mean Coefficient Estimates For Regression of Returns on
Order Backlog Changes and Other Firms Characteristics: 1971-1999
RETit+1 = β0 + β1DBKLGit + β2LSIZEit + β3BETAit + β4BPit + β5LEVit + β6EPit
Variable Coefficients
Intercept 0.194** 0.199** 0.179** 0.177**
DBKLG 0.065** 0.065** 0.064** 0.064**
LSIZE -0.016** -0.016** -0.016** -0.018**
BETA 0.017 0.018
BP 0.035** 0.035** 0.040** 0.037**
LEV -0.001** -0.001** -0.001**
EP 0.050
** denotes significance at the 0.01 level using a two-tailed t-test. 
t-statistic is computed as the ratio of the mean of the annual coefficients
to the standard error from the coefficients distribution. 
Regression coefficients are estimated for each year of the sample period.
Coefficients are the mean of regression estimates over 29 regressions
from 1971-1999. 
Rit+1 is one-year buy-and-hold raw returns. 
DBKLGit is change in order backlog.
LSIZEit is the log of size. 
BETAit is CAPM beta. It is estimated from regression of monthly raw
returns on risk free rates and value weighted portfolio over a 60 month
period before the portfolio is formed. 
BPit is book-to-market ratio. 
LEVit is leverage defined as total assets to book value of equity.
EPit is earnings to price ratio.
future performance. 
Overall, the positive relation between changes in order backlog
and abnormal returns is statistically significant. Changes in
order backlog predict returns in excess of the returns expected
from risk factors. These results suggest that the market
underestimates the implications of changes in order backlog for
future performance, which is inconsistent with RSV (2003). 
Do Analysts Fully Incorporate the Information in Order Backlog
Changes?
In this section, we examine whether analysts are efficient in
processing the information contained in changes in order
backlog. Specifically, to gain insights into investors’ mispricing of
order backlog, we examine the pattern of analysts’ forecast
errors. RSV (2003) suggest that analysts fully appreciate the
implications of the level of order backlog for future earnings.
Using a change variable, which is less subject to a measurement
error, we reexamine RSV (2003). 
Thus, an investigation into the role of analysts’ forecasts in the
relation adds to our understanding of whether analysts ’
systematic bias is attributable to mispricing. In fact, an
abundance of prior research suggests that security analysts do
not fully incorporate accounting information in their forecasts.
For example, Mendenhall (1991), Abarbanell and Bernard (1992),
and Eastwood and Nutt (1999) find that analysts underreact to
past earnings information. Klein (1990), Lys and Sohn (1990),
and Abarbanell (1991) present evidence that analysts underreact
to past stock prices. 
To test whether analysts’ bias contributes to the mispricing of
changes in order backlog, we examine the relation between
changes in order backlog and analysts’ forecast errors. If
analysts fully incorporate the implications of changes in order
backlog, then their forecast errors should not be related to
changes in order backlog. 
Using the IBES annual summary file, we measure the forecast
errors for fiscal year t+1. We use the median forecast as the
consensus forecast. Then, we relate changes in order backlog in
fiscal year t to the forecast errors in fiscal year t+1. To ensure
that analysts have order backlog information for fiscal year t, we
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start to track their forecast errors from 7 months before the fiscal
year end of year t+1. If analysts’ forecasts fully reflect the
information embedded in changes in order backlog, we expect
that their forecast errors are not associated with changes in
order backlog.
Table 4 provides the forecast errors across portfolios ranked on
changes in order backlog at the fiscal period end of year t+1.
Consistent with analyst bias in forecasts, there is a significant,
positive relation between changes in order backlog and the
forecast errors, except for the mean forecast errors (FERR1). The
median forecast error from FERR1 in the lowest decile is 0.0174
(the optimistic bias is 1.74% relative to actual earnings) and that
in the highest decile is 0.000 (almost unbiased). The difference in
the forecast errors between the highest and lowest decile
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FERR1 FERR1 FERR2 FERR2
Low 1,129 -0.5226 -0.0174 1,132 -0.0596 -0.0012
2 1,246 -0.6264 -0.0237 1,247 -0.0375 -0.0015
3 1,334 -0.4346 -0.0049 1,339 -0.0580 -0.0002
4 1.360 -0.2999 -0.0097 1,363 -0.0356 -0.0006
5 1,376 -0.3254 -0.0074 1,374 -0.0216 -0.0004
6 1,351 -0.4681 0.0000 1,350 -0.0172 0.0000
7 1,349 -0.2134 -0.0054 1,347 -0.0234 -0.0004
8 1,267 -0.3330 0.0000 1,269 -0.0167 0.0000
9 1,197 -0.3926 0.0000 1,196 -0.0211 0.0000
High 1,042 -0.4519 0.0000 1,042 -0.0221 0.0000
High-Low 0.0707 0.0174†† 0.0375** 0.0012††
** denotes significance at the 0.01 level using a two-tailed t-test.
†† denotes significance at the 0.01 level using a two-tailed wilcoxon
ranksum test.
FERR1 is the forecast error defined as actual earnings less the median
forecast (at the fiscal period end of year t+1) divided by the absolute
value of actual eps.
FERR2 is the forecast error defined as actual earnings less the median
forecast (at the fiscal period end of year t+1) divided by price.
The high-low forecast error is the difference between the forecast error
in the highest order backlog change portfolio and the forecast error in
the lowest order backlog change portfolio.
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Figure 2. Analyst Forecast Errors for Deciles of Order Backlog
Change Portfolios.
This figure presents median forecast errors in the next year after
forming portfolios on ranked order order backlog changes. Month 0 is
the month of the fiscal year end of year t+1. FERR1 is the forecast error
defined as actual earnings less the median forecast (at the fiscal period
end of year t+1) divided by the absolute value of actual eps.
FERR2 is the forecast error defined as actual earnings less the median
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portfolios is significant (p-value < 0.01). The fifth and sixth
columns in Table 3 manifest the relation more clearly. The mean
(median) forecast error from FERR2 in the lowest decile is -
0.0596 (-0.0012).7) In contrast, the mean (median) forecast error
from FERR2 in the highest decile is -0.0221 (0.000). The mean
and median differences of the forecast errors between the highest
and lowest decile portfolios are statistically significant (p-value <
0.01). Put differently, when the second forecast error (FERR2) is
used, the mean (median) optimistic bias in the lowest decile is
5.9% (0.12%) relative to price, while the mean (median)
optimistic bias in the highest decile is 2.2% (0.000%) relative to
price. 
To further investigate the pattern of forecast errors across
changes in order backlog, we compute the median forecast errors
from 7 months before fiscal year t+1. Figure 2 plots analysts’
forecast errors (FERR1 and FERR2, respectively) for fiscal year t+
1 over the 7 months following the announcement of results in
year t. It illustrates the behavior of the median forecast errors in
the highest and lowest deciles of changes in order backlog. The
most recent FERR1 (FERR2) in the graph correspond to -0.017 
(-0.001) for the lowest decile and 0.00 (0.00) for the highest
decile in Table 4. Consistent with prior literature, optimism in
analysts’ forecasts decreases as the fiscal period end nears. The
optimistic bias of the lowest decile (relative to the highest decile)
is pronounced at all points in time. This suggests that analysts’
overoptimism persists into year t+1 (over which returns are
computed) for firms in the lowest decile group. 
To formally test the relation between changes in order backlog
and the forecast errors, we sort changes in order backlog into 10
groups and estimate the following regression:
FERR2it+1 = β0 + β1RDBKLGit
where FERR2it+1 is the forecast error defined as actual earnings
less the median forecast (at the fiscal period end of year t+1)
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7) The forecast error deflated by price is more frequently used in the literature
because the earnings deflator close to zero induces undue influence on the
forecast error. For example, Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003), Bradshaw,
Richardson, and Sloan (1999), and Brown (2001) compute the forecast error
scaled by price.
divided by price, and RDBKLGit is the portfolio decile ranking.
Table 5 provides statistical significance of the relation between
changes in order backlog and analysts’ forecast errors. We
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Table 5. Regressions of Forecast Errors on Order Backlog Change
Panel A: FERR1 
FERR1it+1 = β0 + β1RDBKLGit
Month relative to 
the fiscal period β0 β1 Adj-R2
end of year t + 1
-7 -0.989** 0.050** 0.004
-6 -0.886** 0.038** 0.003
-5 -0.823** 0.035** 0.003
-4 -0.702** 0.027** 0.002
-3 -0.644** 0.026** 0.002
-2 -0.558** 0.020** 0.001
-1 -0.441** 0.014** 0.001
0 -0.376** 0.014** 0.001
Panel B: FERR2
FERR1it+1 = β0 + β1RDBKLGit
Month relative to 
the fiscal period β0 β1 Adj-R2
end of year t + 1
-7 -0.068** 0.004** 0.003
-6 -0.104** 0.010* 0.000
-5 -0.062** 0.004** 0.002
-4 -0.059** 0.004** 0.002
-3 -0.056** 0.004** 0.002
-2 -0.052** 0.003** 0.001
-1 -0.050** 0.003** 0.001
0 -0.050** 0.004** 0.001
* denotes significance at the 0.05 level using a two-tailed t-test.
** denotes significance at the 0.01 level using a two-tailed t-test.
FERR1 is the forecast error defined as actual earnings less the median
forecast (at the fiscal period end of year t+1) divided by the absolute
value of actual eps.
FERR2 is the forecast error defined as actual earnings less the median
forecast (at the fiscal period end of year t+1) divided by price. 
Month 0 is the month for the fiscal period end of year t+1. Month-1 is
one month before the fiscal period end. 
RDBKLGit is the portfolio decile 
regress the forecast errors on the decile portfolio ranking of
changes in order backlog from 7 months before the fiscal end of
year t+1. Panel A of table 5 report the results from FERR1. The
intercept is negative and statistically different from zero (p-value
< 0.01), indicating that analysts’ forecasts are on average
optimistic. The coefficient on the decile ranking is positive and
statistically significant. This means that analysts tend to be
overoptimistic about low-decile portfolios (relative to high-decile
portfolios). This pattern persists through the periods from -7
before the fiscal year end t+1 to the fiscal year end t+1. In Panel
B of table 5, we also find similar results using FERR2. This
evidence suggests that even though information on order backlog
is publicly available, analysts do not adjust for their bias related
to order backlog. Analysts appear to be more optimistic about
those firms with steep declines in order backlog, consistent with
the results from stock prices. 
Taken together, the results are consistent with the conjecture
that analysts’ forecasts do not fully reflect the implications of
changes in order backlog. The consensus forecast is more likely
to be upwardly biased for low-decile portfolios. This upward bias
contributes to the underperformance of low-decile portfolios. The
evidence that changes in order backlog are not impounded in
analysts’ forecasts suggests that analysts contribute to the
mispricing of order backlog.
CONCLUSIONS
Motivated by RSV (2003) ’s evidence about investors
overweighting information on order backlog and the use of a level
variable (which may not be comparable across industries), we
reexamine the relation between order backlog and future
returns. Specifically, using changes in order backlog from the
COMPUSTAT files from 1971 to 1999, we examine whether the
market fully reflects the implications of changes in order backlog
for future earnings. We confirm that order backlog numbers are
economically significant when forecasting a firm ’s future
earnings (untabulated). 
However, contrary to RSV (2003), we find evidence that
investors underreact to information embedded in order backlog
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changes. We find that changes in order backlog predict returns
over those anticipated using risk proxies during the sample
period. Our findings also demonstrate that professional
investment intermediaries do not “see through” the information
associated with changes in order backlog. They appear to be
optimistic about firms with steep declines in order backlog, thus
contributing to the overvaluation of those stocks. 
In summary, we want to highlight the importance of the
transparent disclosure of non-GAAP leading indicators. In this
paper, we do not investigate why analysts and the market do not
efficiently process information regarding changes in order
backlog for future earnings. One interpretation of our results is
that the disclosure of non-GAAP leading indicators is not
transparent, and thus investors do not fully appreciate the
implications of order backlog changes.8)
Consistently, a random examination of information on order
backlog from financial statements in the sample firms shows a
wide variation of disclosure quality. It would be useful to gain
additional insights into whether firms use order backlog
disclosure strategically and the extent to which the return
predictability using changes in order backlog is a result of this
behavior. We are hoping that future research sheds light on
understanding this issue. 
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